Threat modeling
Threat models grounded in your repository, a SECURITY_MODEL.md, ownership and bus factor of sensitive code, and secrets leaking through serialization.
Category: Security. By playbookrun. Reviewed by PlaybookRun before publishing. Installs in Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI and more.
Tags: threat-modeling, security, trust-boundaries, secrets, security-model
Skills
- Threat Model Source Code Repo (security-threat-model): Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats/abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work.
- Security Ownership Map (security-ownership-map): Analyze git repositories to build a security ownership topology (people-to-file), compute bus factor and sensitive-code ownership, and export CSV/JSON for graph databases and visualization. Trigger only when the user explicitly wants a security-oriented ownership or bus-factor analysis grounded in git history (for example: orphaned sensitive code, security maintainers, CODEOWNERS reality checks for risk, sensitive hotspots, or ownership clusters). Do not trigger for general maintainer lists or non-security ownership questions.
- security-model (security-model): Define, review, or update SECURITY_MODEL.md files that tell security review tools a repository's threat model, trust boundaries, invariants, reportable finding classes, and exclusions. Use when asked to "write a security model", "threat model this repo for scanners", "define security review scope", "what counts as a vulnerability here", "update SECURITY_MODEL.md", "why did the scanner flag or miss this", or to check whether existing security guidance still matches the code. Not for running a security review or editing the SECURITY.md disclosure policy.
- Secret Serialization Review (secret-serialization): Finds secrets, tokens, passwords, and API keys that can leak through generated serialization: Python dataclass repr and asdict, attrs, pydantic model_dump, NamedTuple, JavaScript JSON.stringify and util.inspect, structured logs, tracing spans, and error reports. Use when asked to "check for secret serialization", "credential in repr", "repr=False audit", "secret in spans", "token in logs", or when a change adds a credential field to a dataclass, model, or config object, or adds code that stringifies whole objects or every kwarg into telemetry.
Install
claude plugin marketplace add Fcakiroglu16/marketplace claude plugin install threat-modeling@playbookrun